Market structures: from competition to monopoly

Learn how firms set price and output under perfect competition, monopoly, oligopoly and monopolistic competition, and meet deadweight loss, the Lerner and Herfindahl–Hirschman indices and basic game theory.

  • University
  • 25 min
  • 10 questions
  • Lesson 10 of 12

In this lesson you will learn

  • Compare the four market structures by their key features
  • Apply a competitive firm's shutdown rule
  • Calculate a monopolist's price, profit and deadweight loss
  • Measure concentration with the HHI and find the Nash equilibrium of a simple game

Hundreds of farmers selling tomatoes at a market cannot change the price on their own, but a city's only water supplier can. A handful of mobile operators watch each other's every move. The same MR = MC rule gives very different results in these markets. The reason is market structure: the number of sellers, how differentiated the product is and how hard it is to enter the market.

FeaturePerfect competitionMonopolistic competitionOligopolyMonopoly
Number of firmsVery manyManyA few large firmsOne
ProductIdenticalDifferentiatedIdentical or differentiatedNo close substitutes
EntryFreeEasyDifficultBlocked
Power over priceNone (P = MR)SmallLarge, but depends on rivalsVery large
ExampleFarm produce marketsCafés, hairdressersMobile networks, airlinesWater and power grids

Perfect competition

Under perfect competition a firm is a price taker: if it charges more than the market price, buyers go next door. So MR = P, and the optimal output satisfies P = MC. In the short run a firm may earn a profit or make a loss. Even with a loss it may pay to keep producing, because fixed costs must be paid anyway. In the long run profits attract new firms, supply grows and the price falls to minimum average cost: economic profit becomes zero.

Short run: shut down if P < min AVClong run: P = MC = min ATC

Where

P
market price, ₼
AVC, ATC
average variable and average total cost, ₼ per unit
MC
marginal cost, ₼

Example 1: operate at a loss or shut down?

Problem

A workshop's fixed costs are ₼20 a day. Total costs for 1, 2, 3, 4 units are ₼30, 38, 50, 68 (MC: 10, 8, 12, 18; min AVC = ₼9). The market price fell to ₼14. Should the firm produce? What if the price is ₼8?

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Solution

1) P = ₼14: produce while MC ≤ 14 → Q = 3 (the 4th unit has MC = 18 > 14).
2) Result: 14 · 3 − 50 = −₼8. Shutting down would lose the fixed costs: −₼20. Operating reduces the loss, because P = 14 > min AVC = 9.
3) P = ₼8 < min AVC = ₼9: no unit even covers its own variable cost — the firm should shut down, limiting the loss to ₼20.

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Monopoly

A monopolist faces the whole market demand: to sell more, it must cut the price on all units. That is why MR < P. For linear demand P = a − bQ, TR = aQ − bQ², and differentiating gives MR = a − 2bQ: the MR line starts at the same point as demand but falls twice as steeply. The monopolist chooses output where MR = MC and reads the price off the demand curve. Compared with competition, it produces less and charges more, and society suffers a deadweight loss.

P = a − bQ ⇒ MR = a − 2bQL = (P − MC) / P = −1 / EdP = a − bQ ⇒ MR = a − 2bQL = (P − MC) / P = −1 / Ed

Where

a, b
parameters of linear demand (a in ₼, b in ₼ per unit)
MR
marginal revenue, ₼
L
Lerner index — a measure of market power (from 0 to 1)
Ed
price elasticity of demand at the optimum

Example 2: the monopolist's choice and deadweight loss

Problem

Demand is P = 100 − 2Q and marginal cost is constant at MC = ₼20 (no fixed cost). Find the monopolist's output, price and profit. Compare with perfect competition and calculate the deadweight loss.

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Solution

1) MR = 100 − 4Q. Set MR = MC: 100 − 4Q = 20 → Q = 20.
2) Price from demand: P = 100 − 2 · 20 = ₼60.
3) Profit: (60 − 20) · 20 = ₼800.
4) Under perfect competition P = MC: 100 − 2Q = 20 → Q = 40, P = ₼20.
5) Deadweight loss — the area of the triangle: ½ · (60 − 20) · (40 − 20) = ₼400.
6) Lerner: L = (60 − 20)/60 ≈ 0.67. Check: Q = 50 − P/2, Ed = −0.5 · 60/20 = −1.5, −1/Ed ≈ 0.67 ✓.

Interactive

Loading simulation…
The MR line falls twice as steeply as demand. The monopolist produces where MR = MC (Q = 20) and reads the price off the demand line: P = ₼60. Under perfect competition, demand would meet MC at Q = 40, P = ₼20.

Oligopoly and game theory

In an oligopoly a few large firms are interdependent: one firm's price affects the others' profits. Such strategic interaction is studied by game theory. Firms may try to collude secretly (a cartel) to keep prices high, but this is banned by competition law in most countries, including Azerbaijan. On the world oil market, by contrast, governments coordinate openly: OPEC and its partners (OPEC+), which include Azerbaijan, agree on production volumes.

Firm A \ Firm BB: high priceB: low price
A: high price(10; 10)(2; 14)
A: low price(14; 2)(5; 5)
Profits in thousand manat (A; B). This is the classic game called the “prisoner's dilemma”.

Example 3: the Nash equilibrium

Problem

In the game in the table, find each firm's dominant strategy and the Nash equilibrium. Why is the outcome “bad” for both firms?

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Solution

1) For A: if B sets a high price, A earns more with a low price (14 > 10); if B sets a low price, A again earns more with a low price (5 > 2). So “low price” is A's dominant strategy. The game is symmetric, so the same holds for B.
2) Nash equilibrium: (low; low) → (5; 5). Neither firm can gain by changing its strategy alone.
3) Yet (high; high) would give both 10. Individually rational choices lead to a collectively worse outcome — which is why cartels tend to be unstable.

To measure how concentrated a market is, competition authorities use the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI): add up the squares of all firms' market shares (in percent). A pure monopoly has HHI = 100² = 10,000; a market of many small firms is close to zero.

HHI = s₁² + s₂² + … + sₙ² = ∑ sᵢ²

Where

sᵢ
market share of firm i, in % (e.g. 40% → 40)
n
number of firms in the market

Example 4: how does a merger change concentration?

Problem

Four firms have market shares of 40%, 30%, 20% and 10%. Find the HHI. If the 20% and 10% firms merge, by how much does the HHI rise?

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Solution

1) HHI = 40² + 30² + 20² + 10² = 1600 + 900 + 400 + 100 = 3000.
2) After the merger the shares are 40, 30, 30 → HHI = 1600 + 900 + 900 = 3400.
3) Increase: 400. Shortcut: ΔHHI = 2 · s₁ · s₂ = 2 · 20 · 10 = 400.

Monopolistic competition

Cafés, clothes shops and hairdressers are numerous and entry is easy, but each one's product is a little different: location, taste, brand, service. This difference gives each firm a little market power, so P > MC. Short-run profit is possible, but as new rivals enter, each firm's demand shrinks until, in the long run, P = ATC — economic profit is zero. Firms produce less than the output with minimum average cost (excess capacity) — the “price” paid for variety.

Remember

  • Under perfect competition P = MR = MC; in the long run P = min ATC and economic profit is zero.
  • In the short run a firm should shut down if P < min AVC.
  • A monopolist picks output where MR = MC and takes the price from demand: lower output, higher price and a deadweight loss.
  • Oligopolists are interdependent; the prisoner's dilemma explains why cartels break down.
  • HHI = ∑ sᵢ²; a merger raises the HHI by 2 · s₁ · s₂.
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Question 1 / 10. A monopolist faces demand P = 120 − 2Q and MC = ₼40. What are the optimal output and price?